The project aims to investigate the impact of economic indicators on decisions of economic and financial importance in the constitutional state. It is these decisions of marked political importance, adopted in the context of the government-parliament circuit, which, starting from the economic crisis, seem to be particularly influenced by quantitative values (elaborated above all in the European context); indeed, in some cases, the indicators assume a strong preceptive meaning, capable of binding the exercise of the functions (legislative, political, and not only) of the traditional powers of the State. Through the mapping of the relevant macro-economic indicators, the analysis of their structure and the modalities of normative transposition, the survey wants to define the degree of effectiveness on public policies, and to question their presumed neutrality and their compatibility with the procedures and values crystallized in the constitutional text.
The state budget decision has always assumed a profound political value, both because it touched, at the dawn of the liberal state, the distribution of financial power between government and parliament, and because it involved, in the evolution of the Rechtsstaat in the constitutional state, the relationship between institutions and fundamental values laid down in the Constitution. The intrinsic political value of the budgetary decision now seems to be deeply questioned. It appears to be increasingly conditioned by objective factors, such as indicators and economic quantities quantifiable in numerical terms, which put under pressure not only the discretionary power of the government and parliament, but also the values indicated in the constitutional pact.
In this respect, the recent economic crisis has exacerbated some of the trends already present in the European framework. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) established the separation between monetary policies, entrusted to the centralised management of a technical body, the ECB, and economic policies, coordinated at intergovernmental level. The key instrument of this coordination was the Stability and Growth Pact (1997), and in particular the parameters provided for therein, aimed at limiting the deficit and debt of the States to between 3% and 60% of GDP. More recently, the crisis has led to a clear intensification of the use of economic parameters as factors influencing public policies. Think of the rating agencies' estimates or, to remain within the European framework, the Fiscal Compact (2012). At the national level, the l. cost. 1/2012 (implemented by Law 243/2012), which constitutionalised the principle of budgetary balance as defined by the European indicators, was the most striking example of this.
While anchoring political decisions on the basis of uniform parameters responds to the need to coordinate economic policies, their use is problematic from the point of view of the democratic basis of the decision: to what extent are they axiologically neutral? What is the legitimacy of the people who draw them up? What is their impact on the decisions of political bodies? In the light of this, it seems necessary to question how the balance between political and technical-economic legitimacy is being redefined, in connection with the processes of European and international integration, in order to assess its compatibility with the structure and values of the constitutional State.
The innovative character of the project concerns both the object and the method. As part of the ongoing debate at national and European level on technocracy and democratic legitimacy, the research explores a still underdeveloped strand, especially in a constitutionalist key. To this end, it aims to create a synergy between legal and economic competences, so as to complete the theoretical analysis with an understanding of the concrete functioning and impact of indicators on the political-constitutional level.